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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INSURER ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NEXT GENERATION OF
HEALTH REFORM
KATIE KEITH*
ABSTRACT
Democrats continue to debate how to extend health insurance coverage to
the remaining uninsured and improve the affordability and quality of coverage
and care. Prior intraparty debates—over whether to build upon the Affordable
Care Act, create a public option, or expand the Medicare program to all (or
more)—have centered on how to best accomplish these goals and whether health
care delivery should be mediated through public versus private payers. These
are worthwhile debates, but the history of health reform suggests that private
health insurers are here to stay. This Article accepts the premise that future
coverage expansions will likely rely on private insurers. Assuming so, I argue
that more attention must be paid to holding these entities accountable for the
government-subsidized benefits they offer. While the Affordable Care Act
ushered in reforms that have addressed many historic insurance industry
abuses, additional accountability measures are urgently needed to ensure
access to care, increase affordability, and advance equity. This Article identifies
several policy options that would help achieve these goals and could constitute
part of an updated, post-Affordable Care Act patient bill of rights. Looking
ahead, federal and state policymakers must pair coverage expansions with
accountability mechanisms to maximize taxpayer value in subsidizing private
coverage across a range of public programs.

* Director of the Health Policy and the Law Initiative at the O’Neill Institute for National and
Global Health Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and Associate Research Professor at
the Center on Health Insurance Reforms at Georgetown University. The author is grateful to the
excellent research support of Suhasini Ravi and the continued support in all things from Aaron
Cooper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of health care remains a top concern for Americans. 1 This is
unsurprising given ever-rising premiums, deductibles, and medical debt—to
name just a few challenges. 2 Dysfunction in the health care system was on full
display during the COVID-19 pandemic as we saw price gouging for testing, 3
sky-high bills for care, 4 surprise medical bills, 5 and a new wave of provider
consolidation. 6 Given this dysfunction, it is no surprise that the United States
outspends but lags behind other wealthy nations on access to care, administrative
efficiency, and outcomes. 7 And even though the Affordable Care Act (ACA)

1. See, e.g., Audrey Kearney et al., Americans’ Challenges with Health Care Costs, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/americans-challengeswith-health-care-costs/ (describing the challenges that U.S. adults face in affording health care,
filling prescriptions, and paying medical bills).
2. See MITRE-Harris Poll Survey: 75% of Health-Insured Individuals in the U.S. Concerned
About Medical Bills, MITRE (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.mitre.org/news/press-releases/mitreharris-poll-survey-health-insured-individuals-concerned-medical-bills; Michael Karpman et al., In
the Years Before the COVID-19 Pandemic, Nearly 13 Million Adults Delayed or Did Not Get
Needed Prescription Drugs Because of Costs, URB. INST. (Dec. 1, 2021), https://www.urban.org
/research/publication/years-covid-19-pandemic-nearly-13-million-adults-delayed-or-did-not-getneeded-prescription-drugs-because-costs; Gary Claxton et al., 2021 Employer Health Benefits
Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 10, 2021), https://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-EmployerHealth-Benefits-2021-Annual-Survey.pdf; A. Jay Holmgren et al., The Increasing Role of
Physician Practices as Bill Collectors: Destined for Failure, 326 JAMA 695, 695 (2021); Raymond
Kluender et al., Medical Debt in the US, 2009-2020, 326 JAMA 250, 251 (2021).
3. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, This Lab Charges $380 for a Covid Test. Is That What Congress
Had in Mind?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/26/upshot/cost-ofcovid-rapid-test-prices.html; New Data Shows Continued Evidence of COVID-19 Testing Price
Gouging, AHIP (Jul. 20, 2021), https://www.ahip.org/new-data-shows-continued-evidence-ofcovid-19-testing-price-gouging.
4. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Covid Killed His Father. Then Came $1 Million in Medical Bills,
N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/21/upshot/covid-bills-financiallong-haulers.html; Joseph Goldstein, She Survived the Coronavirus. Then She Got a $400,000
Medical Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/14/nyregion/corona
virus-billing-nyc.html.
5. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, A $52,112 Air Ambulance Ride: Coronavirus Patients Battle
Surprise Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/upshot/corona
virus-surprise-medical-bills.html.
6. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Buoyed by Federal Covid Aid, Big Hospital Chains Buy Up
Competitors, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/21/health/covidbailout-hospital-merger.html; Richard M. Scheffler & Laura Alexander, Consolidation of Hospitals
During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Government Bailouts and Private Equity, MILBANK Q. OPINION
(July 20, 2021), https://www.milbank.org/quarterly/opinions/consolidation-of-hospitals-duringthe-covid-19-pandemic-government-bailouts-and-private-equity/.
7. See ERIC C. SCHNEIDER ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR, MIRROR 2021:
REFLECTING POORLY – HEALTH CARE IN THE U.S. COMPARED TO OTHER HIGH-INCOME
COUNTRIES 4 (2021) (comparing the performance of health care systems of eleven high-income
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narrowed health disparities, underserved communities—such as people of color,
low-income people, and LGBTQ people, among others—continue to face
significant challenges and disparities in accessing coverage and care. 8
Policymakers disagree on how to confront these multifaceted challenges.
Despite several bipartisan laws enacted in 2020, 9 a significant divide remains
between Democrats and Republicans when it comes to coverage policy. 10 Of
course, disagreement between the two parties is not new—and sometimes masks
disagreement within the two parties, which is the focus of this Article.
Debates over the future of health care reform dominated the Democratic
primary ahead of the 2020 election—and continued as Congress considered the
scope of the so-called Build Back Better Act. 11 These debates focus not on
whether to improve upon the ACA and correct the law’s perceived
shortcomings—but on how much change to make and whether health care
delivery should be mediated primarily through public or private payers. 12
countries and concluding that the United States trails “far behind” other high-income countries on
key measures).
8. See, e.g., Roni Caryn Rabin, Racial Inequities Persist in Health Care Despite Expanded
Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/17/health/racial-disparities-healthcare.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2021); Nambi Ndugga & Samantha Artiga, Disparities in Health
and Health Care: 5 Key Questions and Answers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 5 (2021), https://www.kff
.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/disparities-in-health-and-health-care-5-key-ques
tion-and-answers/.
9. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 103, 134 Stat. 2758,
2797 (2020) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg111) (protecting patients from the most pervasive
types of surprise out-of-network medical bills); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3201, 134 Stat. 366 (2020) (requiring insurers and group health plans
to cover COVID-19 vaccines without cost-sharing); Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub.
L. No. 116-127, § 6001, 134 Stat. 201 (2020) (requiring insurers and group health plans to cover
COVID-19 testing without cost-sharing).
10. Perspective: How U.S. Health Policy May Play Out Given Partisan Divide, HARV. T.H.
CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/hsph-in-the-news/perspective-how
-u-s-health-policy-may-play-out-given-partisan-divide/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2022); John E.
McDonough, Republicans have Stopped Trying to Kill Obamacare. Here’s What They’re Planning
Instead., POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2022, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04
/26/gop-obamacare-aca-health-care-00027585.
11. Nicole Rapfogel et al., The Build Back Better Act Would Improve Health Care and Lower
Costs, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-buildback-better-act-would-improve-health-care-and-lower-costs/ (summarizing the health care policies
included in the House-passed version of the Build Back Better Act); see Dylan Scott, The Real
Differences Between the 2020 Democrats’ Health Care Plans, Explained, VOX (Dec. 19, 2019,
8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/19/21005124/2020-presidential-can
didates-health-care-democratic-debate.
12. Jacob Pramuk, ‘Medicare-for-All’ vs. the Public Option: How Health Care Could Shape
the Democratic Primary Race to Take on Trump in the 2020 Election, CNBC (Mar. 10, 2019, 10:53
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/06/2020-democratic-primary-candidates-weigh-medicarefor-all-public-option.html (noting that “[t]he differences on health care in the Democratic primaries
essentially come down to how dramatically to build out the public Medicare and Medicaid
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At one end of the spectrum is single-payer legislation. A single-payer system
would severely limit private health insurance, which advocates argue is
necessary to control costs, simplify the health care system, eliminate profit
motivations, and ensure that health care is guaranteed. 13 Adding a public health
insurance option—a policy embraced by President Biden—generally falls in the
middle of the spectrum. 14 Most public option proposals would leverage
Medicare or Medicaid to compete against private health insurance while
preserving a multi-payer system. At the other end of the spectrum, expanding or
bolstering the ACA marketplaces would rely entirely on private health insurance
with no competition from a public payer, such as Medicare or Medicaid.
Democrats will continue to debate the role of public versus private insurance
in the nation’s health care system. This debate is important and should continue.
But a shift to a fully public payer system may not be reconcilable, at least not in
the near-term, with our current system that relies on a mix of public and
increasingly private insurers to provide for health care benefits. 15 The debate
over public versus private coverage often obscures this reality and assumes that
little can be done to reform the practices of private insurers for the greater good.
The ACA proves that this is not true but also shows how challenging it can be
to hold private insurers accountable—even as we distribute billions in taxpayer
dollars to subsidize their products. 16
This Article first explains how Congress has repeatedly turned to private
health insurers when expanding coverage. With an emphasis on reforms ushered
in by the ACA, this Article describes how current law has banned or limited
many historic insurance industry abuses while also identifying some of the ways
that private insurers are failing to ensure access to care, increase affordability,
and advance equity. These data suggest that additional accountability measures
are needed to realize the goals of health reform and that policymakers could do
more to protect consumers. Finally, this Article identifies a non-exhaustive list
programs”); see Scott, supra note 11 (noting that the “most pronounced difference between the
Democratic health care plans” is whether care is financed through a single government program or
a multi-payer system that includes private insurers).
13. LINDA J. BLUMBERG & JOHN HOLAHAN, THE PROS AND CONS OF SINGLE-PAYER
HEALTH PLANS 3–5 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99918/pros_and
_cons_of_a_single-payer_plan.pdf.
14. See Pramuk, supra note 12 (discussing the health care policies of Democratic presidential
contenders and describing a public option as “a more incremental step” relative to single payer
proposals).
15. See Bob Rosenblatt, Healthcare History: How the Patchwork Coverage Came to Be, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013, 9:47 AM), https://www.latimes.com/health/la-he-health-insurance-history-20
120227-story.html (chronicling the development of private health insurance and a multi-payer
health care system in the United States).
16. See Joseph R. Antos & James C. Capretta, The ACA: Trillions? Yes. A Revolution? No.,
HEALTH AFFS. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20200406.93
812/full/.
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of new policies that federal and state officials should consider to ensure that
taxpayer-subsidized private coverage meets the needs of enrollees and
accomplishes broader health reform goals.
II. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN HEALTH REFORM
Current debates about the role of private insurance underscore the
complexity of the United States’ fragmented health care system. This system—
which was largely unplanned—consists of a patchwork of public and private
health insurance programs. 17
Private health insurance first emerged in the 1930s. 18 Thanks to a wage
freeze and tax rulings during World War II, health insurance would soon become
enshrined as a job-based benefit for millions of Americans—at least those who
could secure higher-paying jobs. 19 Employer-sponsored health insurance soon
became, and remains, the primary source of coverage in the United States 20 and
is the nation’s single largest tax expenditure. 21
While many working-age people obtained private health insurance through
their job, this left significant gaps for those outside of the workforce. 22 To fill
some of these gaps, Congress created the Medicare and Medicaid programs in
1965 to provide coverage and care for older adults, low-income families, and
those with disabilities. 23 While some presidents and members of Congress
continued to champion a national health care system, these efforts failed, 24 and
Congress adopted more incremental reforms throughout the 1990s and early

17. Rosenblatt, supra note 15.
18. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS., THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE
HEALTH INSURANCE 8 (2009) (“Health insurance in its contemporary form can be traced to the
hospital prepayment plan offered by Baylor Hospital to the white public school teachers in Dallas,
Texas in 1932.”).
19. See Aaron E. Carroll, The Real Reason the U.S. Has Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/upshot/the-realreason-the-us-has-employer-sponsored-health-insurance.html (tracing the history of employersponsored coverage).
20. KATHERINE KEISLER-STARKEY & LISA N. BUNCH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2020 3 (2021), https://www.census.gov/content
/dam/Census/library/publications/2021/demo/p60-274.pdf.
21. Tax Expenditures, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/taxpolicy/tax-expenditures (last visited Feb. 25, 2022) (identifying the exclusion of employer
contributions for medical insurance premiums and medical care as the largest tax expenditure at an
estimated cost of $3,005,860,000,000 from fiscal year 2022 to 2031).
22. KEISLER-STARKEY & BUNCH, supra note 20, at 8.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–96.
24. See generally JILL S. QUADAGNO, ONE NATION, UNINSURED: WHY THE U.S. HAS NO
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 9–11 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2005).
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2000s. 25 This was followed by the ACA, enacted in 2010. 26 Even after historic
coverage gains under the ACA, about twenty-eight million people were
uninsured in 2020. 27
A.

Blurring the Line Between Public and Private Coverage

The nation’s health care system reflects a patchwork of public and private
coverage sources. 28 But even our public coverage is increasingly dominated by
private insurers, 29 blurring the line between public and private coverage. Indeed,
most major coverage expansions from the past two decades have further
entrenched the role of private insurers. Even when Congress has bolstered public
coverage programs—by, say, creating the Medicare Part D program 30 or
expanding the Medicaid program 31—Congress (and those implementing the
policy, such as states) have relied heavily on private insurers to deliver new
benefits.
Private health insurers already play a significant role in many of our current
public coverage programs. In programs like Medicare and Medicaid, federal and
state officials contract with private insurers to provide health care coverage to
beneficiaries. 32 In contrast to a fee-for-service model (where the government
pays providers for health care claims), these arrangements are capitated,
meaning the government pays private plans a fixed monthly amount per
beneficiary. 33 This can incentivize private plans to manage beneficiary care
efficiently and effectively, or it can lead private plans to limit care and
expenditures to maximize profit.
Medicaid, the nation’s single largest payer of health care services, is
dominated by managed care companies, which are private insurers that contract
25. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d; Mental
Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874 (1997); Children's Health Insurance
Program, § 1387aa–mm; Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, §§1395w-101–54.
26. §§ 18001–22.
27. KEISLER-STARKEY & BUNCH, supra note 20, at 2.
28. Rosenblatt, supra note 15.
29. See Karen Pollitz et al., What’s the Role of Private Health Insurance Today and Under
Medicare-for-All and Other Public Option Proposals?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 3 (July 30, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/whats-the-role-of-private-health-insurance-todayand-under-medicare-for-all-and-other-public-option-proposals/ (explaining the role that private
insurers play in providing health coverage under Medicare and Medicaid).
30. Thomas R. Oliver et al., A Political History of Medicare and Prescription Drug Coverage,
82 MILBANK Q. 283, 289–90 (2004).
31. Cynthia Cox et al., Potential Costs and Impact of Health Provisions in the Build Back
Better Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 23, 2021), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief
/potential-costs-and-impact-of-health-provisions-in-the-build-back-better-act/.
32. Pollitz et al., supra note 29.
33. Id. at 4.
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with state Medicaid programs to serve Medicaid beneficiaries. 34 In 2019, more
than two-thirds (sixty-nine percent) of all Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled
in comprehensive risk-based managed care. 35 All but ten states use managed
care, and states increasingly use managed care to serve children, low-income
adults, and more medically complex beneficiaries and to provide long-term
services and supports. 36 In thirty-two states, about seventy-nine percent of
children enrolled in the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in 2018
were enrolled in managed care. 37
Private plans also play an increasingly outsized role in Medicare: in
conjunction with traditional Medicare, as an alternative to traditional Medicare,
and in the delivery of prescription drug benefits. Private plans were included at
the onset of the Medicare program, but enrollment was uneven for the first
several decades. 38 Enrollment only began to rise following enactment of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
(MMA), which raised payments to Medicare Advantage plans and created new
private plan options. 39
Enrollment has risen steadily ever since: in 2021, forty-two percent of all
Medicare beneficiaries—about 26.4 million people—were enrolled in private
Medicare Advantage plans, and the Congressional Budget Office expects
enrollment to rise to fifty-one percent by 2030. 40 Growth in Medicare Advantage

34. Id. at 3.
35. Total Medicaid MCO Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/stateindicator/total-medicaid-mco-enrollment/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2022).
36. Elizabeth Hinton et al., 10 Things to Know About Medicaid Managed Care, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/10-things-to-know-about-medic
aid-managed-care/; see also Medicaid Managed Care Penetration Rates by Eligibility Group,
KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/managed-care-penetrationrates-by-eligibility-group/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2022) (showing that managed care provides ninety
percent of coverage to Medicaid eligible children in twenty-six states, expansion adults in twentyone states, the aged and disabled in seventeen states, and all other eligible adults in nineteen states).
37. Medicaid & Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Managed Care Final Rule –
CMS-2408-F, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.cms.gov
/newsroom/fact-sheets/medicaid-childrens-health-insurance-program-chip-managed-care-finalrule-cms-2408-f.
38. Yash M. Patel & Stuart Guterman, The Evolution of Private Plans in Medicare,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issuebriefs/2017/dec/evolution-private-plans-medicare.
39. Id.
40. Meredith Freed et al., Medicare Advantage in 2021: Enrollment Update and Key Trends,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jun. 21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicareadvantage-in-2021-enrollment-update-and-key-trends/ (citing current enrollment data and the
Congressional Budget Office’s baseline projections for 2020). Enrollment in Medicare Advantage
is even greater among people of color: in 2018, about half of all Black and Hispanic beneficiaries,
fifty and fifty-four percent, respectively, were enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan, compared to
only thirty-six percent of White beneficiaries. Nancy Ochieng et al., Racial and Ethnic Health
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appears to be continuing in 2022. 41 Even those with traditional Medicare often
purchase supplemental private coverage, generally known as a Medigap policy,
to help reduce cost-sharing under Medicare Parts A and B and help provide some
extra benefits. 42
A major Medicare benefit—the coverage of outpatient prescription drugs—
is delivered exclusively by private insurers. 43 The Medicare Part D program was
established by the MMA during which “policymakers went to great lengths to
ensure that the new prescription drug benefits will be administered principally
by private companies and not by the federal government.” 44 Medicare
beneficiaries can enroll in a stand-alone private prescription drug plan under
Medicare Part D or through a Medicare Advantage plan. 45 Enrollment in standalone Medicare Part D plans has fallen over time as enrollment in Medicare
Advantage plans has increased. 46
Congress prioritized private health insurance coverage in the ACA as well.
Rather than overhaul the health care system, the ACA was purposely designed
to minimize disruption, especially for the many millions of people with private
coverage offered by larger employers. 47 Though far more disruptive to the
individual and small group markets, the ACA relied on private insurers to offer
marketplace coverage and then subsidized the costs of these private plans for
low- and middle-income people. 48 A public option that would have competed
Inequities and Medicare, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.kff.org/reportsection/racial-and-ethnic-health-inequities-and-medicare-sources-of-coverage/.
41. Bob Herman, The Big Medicare Advantage Players Keep Getting Bigger, AXIOS (Jan. 19,
2022), https://www.axios.com/medicare-advantage-2022-enrollment-unitedhealth-humana-4e555
7ba-6818-4fa9-aa99-68e7e95ed77f.html (“Six health insurers control roughly three-quarters of the
fast-growing Medicare Advantage market, according to an Axios analysis of federal data.”).
42. Wyatt Koma et al., A Snapshot of Sources of Coverage Among Medicare Beneficiaries in
2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/a-snapshotof-sources-of-coverage-among-medicare-beneficiaries-in-2018/.
43. Part D / Prescription Drug Benefits, CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOC., https://medicareadvo
cacy.org/medicare-info/medicare-part-d/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2022).
44. Oliver et al., supra note 30, at 289–90.
45. Id. at 316–17.
46. An Overview of the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/an-overview-of-the-medicare-part-d-pre
scription-drug-benefit/.
47. See Weekly Address: President Obama Outlines Goals for Health Care Reform, WHITE
HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (June 5, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-outlines-goals-health-care-reform (noting the
president’s statement that individuals who liked their current plans would not be forced to change
them under the ACA, minimizing disruption).
48. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1311, 1401, 1402,
124 Stat. 119, 173, 213, 220 (2010) (establishing health exchanges, premium tax credits, and costsharing for qualified plans, respectively); KAISER FAM. FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM:
SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1–2 (2013), https://files.kff.org/attachment/fact-sheetsummary-of-the-affordable-care-act.
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alongside private insurers—heralded by advocates as both a counterweight to
private insurers and a waystation on the transition towards a single-payer
system—was considered during the debate over the ACA but ultimately left out
of the final legislation due to political opposition by moderate Democrats. 49 In
its most significant attempt to expand public coverage, the ACA extended
eligibility for the Medicaid program to low-income adults; this expansion
applied in every state but was ultimately made unenforceable (and thus optional)
for states by the Supreme Court. 50 As noted above, most expansion enrollees are
enrolled in Medicaid managed care, though this was not required by the ACA. 51
B.

Why Private Health Insurance?

There are practical and political reasons for why private health insurance has
become so dominant, even in public programs. Practically, it may be more
efficient for government officials to contract with private insurers rather than
build their own capacity to manage significant new programs or grow existing
programs. Leveraging private insurers to deliver public benefits requires less
direct work by federal officials who may not have the staff, expertise, or other
resources to develop provider networks, create new administrative processes,
and hire new staff with appropriate expertise. 52
Politically, there are strong lobbies in favor of private (over public)
coverage. 53 This includes private health insurers themselves, as well as
49. Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29
HEALTH AFFS. 1117, 1117 (2010). The ACA also authorized Consumer Operated and Oriented
Plans and Multi-State Plans as pseudo-alternatives to the public option, but both programs were
unsuccessful at competing with private insurers. See Phil Galewitz, Obamacare Co-Ops Down from
23 to Final ‘3 Little Miracles’, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 9, 2020), https://khn.org/news
/obamacare-co-ops-down-from-23-to-final-3-little-miracles (noting only three ACA-authorized
nonprofit health insurance co-ops remain); Jonathan Foley et al., For Policy Makers Looking to
Expand Coverage, Lessons from the Demise of the ACA’s Multi-State Plan Program, HEALTH
AFFS. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20190927.150599/full/
(discussing the decision to end the Multi-State Plan Program).
50. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012); KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
supra note 48, at 1.
51. Hinton et al., supra note 36.
52. See, e.g., Jeff Stein & Rachel Roubein, White House Seeks to Speed Potential Medicare
Dental Expansion in Face of Expected Delays, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2021, 1:38 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/09/01/white-house-medicare-dental/. The
authors described concerns raised by federal officials about implementation of a potential new
dental benefit in Medicare and estimating that it could take three to five years to implement these
changes. Id. Cited challenges include vetting thousands of new dentists for the Medicare system
and devising a new pricing system for reimbursement of dentists. Id. To speed implementation of
this new benefit, one option under consideration by policymakers was “working with private dental
companies with access to better data.” Id.
53. See Robert Pear, Health Care and Insurance Industries Mobilize to Kill ‘Medicare for All’,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/us/politics/medicare-for-all-
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hospitals, physicians, and other providers that prefer the higher rates paid by
private health insurers over lower public payer rates. 54 Capitation can also be an
attractive model for policymakers in search of budget predictability, improved
access to care, and cost control. Some policymakers also have an ideological
preference for private coverage. 55
Federal and state policymakers also tend to want to tweak existing policies
or fill gaps in the current system as opposed to tearing down and starting anew.
Even if starting anew would be more efficient or equitable, leaders are often
reluctant to make changes that would disrupt the lives of their constituents. 56
This history does not mean that expansions to public coverage are
impossible or not worth pursuing. But private insurers may be enduring given
their role in financing care for millions of people through job-based coverage,
individual coverage, Medicaid, Medicare, and more. 57 If we assume, then, that
private health insurers are here to stay, we must turn to better ways to hold these
entities accountable for the government-subsidized benefits they offer.
III. INSURER ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER CURRENT LAW
The ACA dramatically improved the availability, affordability, and
adequacy of private health insurance, especially for those who purchase
coverage in the individual and small group markets. 58 Among its other changes,
the law included new market reforms that set heightened standards for private
insurers. 59 Many of these reforms—such as guaranteed access to coverage, a ban
lobbyists.html (noting extensive lobbying efforts by the health care and insurance industries to
oppose public coverage options such as “Medicare for All”).
54. See Adam Cancryn, The Army Built to Fight ‘Medicare for All’, POLITICO (Nov. 25, 2019,
5:08 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2019/11/25/medicare-for-all-lobbying-072110
(discussing how health insurance companies, hospitals, drugmakers, and physicians came together
to lobby against “Medicare for All,” in part due to the lower reimbursement rates they would receive
under a public coverage option).
55. Alan C. Monheit, Ideology, Politics, and Health Care Reform, 44 INQUIRY: J. HEALTH
CARE ORG., PROVISION, & FIN. 377, 377 (2007) (discussing how differences regarding health care
reform are based on opposing ideologies).
56. See Sean Illing, Two Eminent Political Scientists: The Problem with Democracy Is Voters,
VOX (June 24, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/1/15515820
/donald-trump-democracy-brexit-2016-election-europe (noting how people blame politicians when
their lives are disrupted, and they vote based on momentary feelings rather than views of how a
policy will improve or hurt their life in the long-run); see Terry M. Moe, The Politics of the Status
Quo, in OUR SCHOOLS AND OUR FUTURE . . . ARE WE STILL AT RISK? 177, 178 (Paul E. Peterson
ed., 2003) (noting that most successful educational reforms maintain the status quo and do not
create large disruptions to people’s lives).
57. See Pollitz et al., supra note 29, at 2 (noting the majority of Americans have health
coverage through a private insurer).
58. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 48, at 2, 3 (discussing how the cost-sharing and
premium subsidies increased affordability for health insurance).
59. See id. at 1 (noting the new regulations on private health insurance plans).
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on preexisting condition exclusions, a ban on lifetime and annual dollar limits,
modified community rating, and the coverage of a minimum set of essential
health benefits—were revolutionary and a stark departure from the relatively
limited federal regulation of private health insurance up to that point. 60
This Part does not describe every component of the ACA, but rather
identifies key reforms to improve insurer accountability, and it provides a brief
assessment of whether those reforms have met this goal. Several of these
provisions were previously considered in Congress but not enacted until the
ACA, 61 becoming part of the ACA known as the “patient’s bill of rights,” a set
of policies that went into effect on September 23, 2010. 62 These reforms ended
some of the insurance industry’s most hated practices and remain some of the
ACA’s most popular provisions even today. 63
A.

Rescissions

The ACA banned rescissions, the retroactive cancellation of an enrollee’s
coverage once they became sick, except in the narrowest of circumstances. 64
Rescissions often followed a practice known as post-claims underwriting. 65

60. See BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45146, FEDERAL
REQUIREMENTS ON PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS 3 (2018) (noting many of the federal
regulations on private health insurance were either established by or expanded under the ACA);
OFF. HEALTH POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE REGULATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET, at 3, 24–28 (2008),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/private/pdf/75786/report.pdf (showing that prior to the
ACA, most private individual health insurance plans were regulated primarily at the state level).
61. Most of these early market reforms were considered by prior congresses. See Katie Keith
et al., Implementing the Affordable Care Act: State Action on Early Market Reforms,
COMMONWEALTH FUND 10 n.2 (Mar. 2012), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications
/issue-briefs/2012/mar/implementing-affordable-care-act-state-action-early-market (describing the
history of many of the provisions that would become the ACA’s patient bill of rights).
62. See, e.g., Center for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, The Affordable Care Act’s New
Patient’s Bill of Rights, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (June 22, 2010), https://www.cms
.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/aca-new-patients-bill-of-rights (“The Affordable
Care Act cracks down on the some of the most egregious practices of the insurance industry while
providing the stability and the flexibility that families and businesses need to make the choices that
work best for them.”); Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: A Patient Bill of Rights,
HEALTH AFFS. (June 23, 2010), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20100623.0054
86/full.
63. Liz Hamel et al., 5 Charts About Public Opinion on the Affordable Care Act and the
Supreme Court, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/pollfinding/5-charts-about-public-opinion-on-the-affordable-care-act-and-the-supreme-court/.
64. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2712, 124 Stat. 119,
131 (2010).
65. Insurers are prohibited from retroactively cancelling coverage except in the case of fraud
or intentional misrepresentation of a material fact. See, e.g., Gary Claxton et al., Pre-Existing
Conditions and Medical Underwriting in the Individual Insurance Market Prior to the ACA,
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After an enrollee needed care, their insurer would revisit their original
application for coverage. 66 Insurers would pore over the details of the
application to look for evidence that the consumer made a mistake on the
application. 67 If a mistake was found, the insurer would argue that it never would
have issued the policy in the first place and retroactively cancel the coverage,
treating the patient as if they were never insured and leaving the patient liable
for all medical bills dating back to the beginning of the policy. 68
Rescissions were disruptive to care and financially devastating for families
whose insurance did not work when they needed it most. 69 This practice received
a significant amount of negative attention leading up to the ACA. 70 Congress
held hearings and conducted investigations 71 while news outlets covered
heartbreaking stories of patients whose life-saving care was denied after a
rescission. 72
The ban on rescissions created a bright-line rule and changed industry
practice by prohibiting insurers from cancelling coverage just because an
enrollee needed care. Combined with other ACA requirements for standardized
enrollment processes and benefits, the ACA provision prohibiting rescissions
has been effective at ending this practice and protecting consumers from
arbitrary rescissions. 73
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/pre-existingconditions-and-medical-underwriting-in-the-individual-insurance-market-prior-to-the-aca/.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 14.
70. See John Reichard, Benefit ‘Rescissions’ Prompt Wider Waxman Probe of Insurers,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jul. 17, 2008), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/news
letter-article/benefit-rescissions-prompt-wider-waxman-probe-insurers (describing patient stories,
media coverage, and a congressional hearing on rescissions).
71. E.g., Termination of Individual Health Policies by Insurance Companies, Hearing Before
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Com. H. R., 111th Cong.
(2009); Reichard, supra note 70 (summarizing a 2008 hearing on rescissions before the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee).
72. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, Health Insurance Changes Come Too Late for Some, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Sept. 23, 2010, 7:55 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130040
790; Murray Waas, Insurer Targeted HIV Patients to Drop Coverage, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2010,
7:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insurers-idUSTRE62G2DO20100317; Alice
Gomstyn, Health Insurance Insider: ‘They Dump the Sick’, ABC NEWS (June 23, 2009, 3:39 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/Health/story?id=7911195&page=1; Joanne Silberner, Insurers
Revoke Policies to Avoid Paying High Costs, ST. LOUIS NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 22, 2009,
12:01AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105680875; Lisa Girion,
Anthem Blue Cross Sued over Rescissions, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.la
times.com/business/la-fi-insure17apr17-story.html; Lisa Girion, Health Net Ordered to Pay $9
Million After Canceling Cancer Patient’s Policy, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2008, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-insure23feb23-story.html.
73. Claxton, supra note 65.
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Appeals Processes

The ACA ensured that all enrollees have the right to appeal decisions made
by their insurer. Though there were some appeals standards that predated the
ACA, these requirements varied and had gaps. 74 The ACA created uniform
standards for internal and external appeals processes that apply to all nongrandfathered health insurance plans. 75 Enrollees whose claims are denied can
first file an internal appeal with their insurer. 76 If the insurer upholds their
decision to deny payment, then the enrollee can appeal to an independent entity
to review the insurer’s determination. 77
Denied claims are often reversed on appeal, but few consumers file an
appeal. 78 Data from 2019 suggests that 119 marketplace insurers denied 40.4
million claims, and that consumers appealed fewer than 64,000 of these
denials—an appeals rate of only 0.2%. 79 Of appealed denials, about forty percent
were reversed in favor of the patient. 80 The data is even more sobering for
external review: of the fifty-five marketplace insurers that reported data on
external appeals from 2019, only thirty-one insurers had more than ten external
appeals, suggesting that fewer than one in 20,000 denied claims are ever
appealed to external review entities. 81
The right to appeal is critical to vindicating consumer rights, but these data
suggest that these rights are underutilized. 82 The low number of external
reviews, in particular, may reflect the fact that not all denials are eligible for this
process under regulations put in place by the Obama administration. 83 An initial
interim final rule issued in 2010 permitted the appeal of any “adverse benefit

74. Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(2)(A), (b)(2). The statute and implementing regulations include
detailed requirements for standards for internal and external review processes, but those details are
not discussed here.
76. Karen Pollitz, Consumer Appeal Rights in Private Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec.
10, 2021), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/consumer-appeal-rights-in-privatehealth-coverage/#.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Karen Pollitz & Daniel McDermott, Claims Denials and Appeals in ACA Marketplace
Plans, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief
/claims-denials-and-appeals-in-aca-marketplace-plans/.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Timothy Jost, Administration Finalizes Regulations Implementing ACA Insurance
Reforms (Updated), HEALTH AFFS. (Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hb
log20151114.051786/full/ (noting that a final regulation on the appeals process narrowed the scope
of review from any adverse benefit determination to only claims that involve medical judgment and
rescission decisions).
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determination” by an insurer. 84 But amendments to that rule in 2011
permanently narrowed external review to only claims that involve medical
judgment and rescission. 85 As a result, claims may not be making it to external
review because the scope of that process is unduly narrow. 86
C. Medical Loss Ratio
The ACA requires insurers to spend a minimum amount of premium dollars
towards health care or refund the difference to consumers. 87 This medical loss
ratio (MLR) requirement was designed to help ensure that consumer premiums
are spent by insurers on actual health care—rather than profit, bonuses,
administrative expenses, or marketing. 88 Under Section 2718 of the Public
Health Service Act, insurers must spend a certain percentage of their premium
revenue—eighty percent in the individual and small group markets and eightyfive percent in the large group market—on health care claims or health care
quality improvement expenses. 89 If insurers fail to meet this minimum MLR
threshold, they must rebate the difference to their enrollees. 90
Average MLRs and rebates in the group markets have been relatively stable
since Section 2718 went into effect in 2011. 91 But the individual market has been
far more volatile with average MLRs ranging from eighty to ninety percent
84. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,329, 43,350–51 (July 23, 2010) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §
147.136, 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719, 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T).
85. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers: Rules Relating to Internal Claims and
Appeals and External Review Processes, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,207, 37,216 (June 24, 2011) (codified at
26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T, 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719, 45 C.F.R. § 147.136) (“[T]his amendment
suspends the broad scope of claims eligible for the Federal external review process and narrows the
scope to claims that involve (1) medical judgment (excluding those that involve only contractual
or legal interpretation without any use of medical judgment), as determined by the external
reviewer; or (2) a rescission of coverage.”).
86. Pollitz & McDermott, supra note 79, at 1. (“Of all denials with reasons reported for 2019,
about 18% were denied because the claim was for an excluded service; about 9% were denied due
to prior authorization or lack of referral, and less than 1% were denied based on medical necessity.
The remaining plan-reported denials (72%) were denied for other reasons.”).
87. Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb.
29, 2012), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/explaining-health-care-reform-medicalloss-ratio-mlr/. The ACA also imposed new MLR requirements on Medicare Advantage plans. See
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-27(e)(4). Plans that fail to meet an MLR of at least eighty-five percent must
remit the difference to the federal government and could be barred from further enrollment or see
their contracts cancelled if low MLRs persist. Id.
88. Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), supra note 87.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a)(1)‒(2), (b)(1)(A)(i)‒(ii).
90. Id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A).
91. Daniel McDermott & Cynthia Cox, Data Note: 2021 Medical Loss Ratio Rebates, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/data-note-2021medical-loss-ratio-rebates/.
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initially and then increasing dramatically beginning in 2014 when the ACA’s
broader reforms went into effect. 92 After peaking in 2015, average MLRs in the
individual market fell in 2018 to seventy percent and rebounded slightly to
seventy-four percent in 2020. 93 These low MLRs have led to record-high rebates
beginning in 2019 when total rebates (across all markets) were $1.37 billion
(with total individual market rebates of about $769 million). 94 This was followed
by total rebates of $2.46 billion (including total individual market rebates of
about $1.7 billion) in 2020 95 and total rebates of $2 billion (including total
individual market rebates of about $1.3 billion) in 2021. 96
While insurers struggled financially in the early years of the ACA, that is no
longer the case. High individual market rebates are driven by exceptionally
profitable years, which have continued during the pandemic. 97 In a comparison
of MLRs across markets for 2018 to 2020, insurers offering individual market
coverage have the lowest simple MLR when compared to coverage in the
commercial group market, Medicare Advantage, and Medicaid managed care. 98
This profitability is likely attracting new insurers into the individual market and
leading existing insurers to expand their footprint. 99
Although popular, some evidence suggests that the MLR provision may not
be working as intended. For one, Section 2718 relies on insurer self-reporting of
data and there has generally been lax oversight. 100 One review of insurer MLR
filings found that fourteen percent of insurers are strategically overstating their

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, 2018 MLR Rebates by State, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/DataResources/Downloads/2018-Rebates-by-State.pdf.
95. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, 2019 MLR Rebates by State, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/DataResources/Downloads/2019-Rebates-by-State.pdf.
96. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, 2020 MLR Rebates by State, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/2020rebates-state.pdf.
97. Daniel McDermott et al., Health Insurer Financial Performance in 2020, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (May 3, 2021), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/health-insurer-financialperformance-in-2020/.
98. Id.
99. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Plan Year 2022 Qualified Health Plan Choice
and Premiums in HealthCare.gov States, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS 1, 2 (Oct. 25,
2021), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/2022QHPPremiums
ChoiceReport.pdf (documenting the increase in the number of qualified health plan insurers by
county from plan year 2018 to 2022).
100. See McDermott & Cox, supra note 91.
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claims to avoid rebates. 101 Though not a majority of insurers, this accounts for
hundreds of millions of dollars that would have gone to consumers in the form
of rebates but instead remain with insurers. 102 The Biden administration has also
raised concerns about the quality of MLR reporting by insurers and adopted
clarifications to promote compliance; these clarifications are expected to
increase rebates for consumers by about sixty-two million dollars annually. 103
Others have concluded that the MLR provision has done little to hold down
premiums as hoped and that insurers responded to the MLR incentive by paying
for more care. 104 At a minimum, rebates that total billions of dollars suggest that
federally-subsidized premiums are overpriced, contributing to a higher
uninsured rate. 105
D. Rate Review
Rate review—a process used to assess whether an insurer’s proposed rate is
based on accurate data and realistic assumptions and projections—should work
in tandem with MLR requirements. 106 Robust rate review can also help control
premium increases and address the underlying cost of health care. 107
States have historically had exclusive authority to regulate private health
insurance rates in the fully insured market and have taken divergent approaches
to rate regulation over time. 108 But rate review capacity and legal authority
varies significantly by state. 109 Some state officials conduct robust,
comprehensive reviews of rates while others require only an actuarial
certification that rates comply with state law (without requiring any additional

101. Evan Eastman et al., Accounting-Based Regulation: Evidence from Health Insurers and
the Affordable Care Act, 96 ACCT. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3282300.
102. Id.
103. 87 Fed. Reg. 27,208, 27,348–53, 27,368 (May 6, 2022).
104. Steve Cicala et al., Regulating Markups in U.S. Health Insurance, 11 AM. ECON. J.
APPLIED ECONS., Oct. 2019, at 73; Sandra Renfro Callaghan et al., Health Insurers’ Claims and
Premiums Under the Affordable Care Act: Evidence on the Effects of Bright Line Regulations, 87
J. RISK & INS. 67, 69 (2019).
105. See McDermott & Cox, supra note 91 (discussing trends in premiums and medical loss
ratios while noting that high rebates are being driven by significant profits in 2018, 2019, and 2020
despite repeal of the individual mandate and decreases in average premiums).
106. Scott E. Harrington, Medical Loss Ratio Regulation Under the Affordable Care Act, 50
INQUIRY J. 9, 15 (2013).
107. Id. at 13.
108. Sabrina Corlette & Janet Lundy, Rate Review: Spotlight on State Efforts to Make Health
Insurance More Affordable, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 3 (Dec. 2010), https://www.kff.org/wp-content
/uploads/2013/01/8122.pdf.
109. Id.
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documentation). 110 And some state regulators can disapprove rates before
products are sold, while others have no pre-market control. 111
The ACA included enhanced rate review requirements and funding for states
to improve these processes with the goal of improving affordability and
promoting transparency. 112 Under the ACA, each state—or the federal
government on behalf of a state—is required to review proposed rate increases
and assess whether those increases are unreasonable. 113 Rate filings or
justifications must be publicly posted with an opportunity for the public to
review and comment on proposed rate increases. 114 Federal officials must also
designate whether a state has an “effective” rate review process, meaning state
officials receive sufficient data to examine whether a proposed rate increase is
unreasonable. 115 Most states now have an effective rate review program in at
least one insurance market. 116
Rate review improvements under the ACA helped achieve some savings,
particularly in the early years of implementation. 117 However, it is not clear that
rate review continues to have an impact on affordability. This is especially true
given record high MLR rebates in recent years. 118 Rebates help safeguard
against premium overpricing, but more effective rate review would help keep
premiums low in the first place.
IV. TOWARDS A NEW PATIENT BILL OF RIGHTS
The ACA’s reforms notwithstanding, data suggests that there is more work
to be done to ensure that private insurers pay claims, ensure financial security,
promote quality, improve health outcomes, and narrow disparities. Academic
journals, white papers, and the media are replete with stories of how private
insurance—whether in the commercial market, Medicare Advantage, or
Medicaid managed care—may not be meeting these goals. 119 There are reports

110. Id. at 1.
111. Id. at 11.
112. Harrington, supra note 106, at 10.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94(a) (2010).
114. Id.
115. 45 C.F.R. § 154.301(a)(1)–(3).
116. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, State Effective Rate Review Programs, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-andFAQs/rate_review_fact_sheet (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
117. CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., 2012 ANNUAL RATE REVIEW REPORT: RATE REVIEW SAVES ESTIMATED 41 BILLION FOR
CONSUMERS
(2012),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms-Reports-and-Other-Re
sources/rate-review09112012a.
118. See McDermott & Cox, supra note 91 (discussing the link between high medical loss ratio
rebates and premiums).
119. Patel & Guterman, supra note 38.
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on inappropriate claims denials, 120 limited benefits, 121 high cost-sharing, 122
“ghost networks” and other network restrictions, 123 failure to manage care or
fully communicate with members, 124 the gaming of risk adjustment, 125

120. See, e.g., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NO. OEI-09-1600410, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE APPEAL OUTCOMES AND AUDIT FINDINGS RAISE CONCERNS
ABOUT SERVICE AND PAYMENT DENIALS (2018) (finding that Medicare Advantage plans denied
eight percent of claims in 2016, overturned seventy-five percent of denials on appeal from 2014
through 2016, and took enforcement action for inappropriate denials and providing incomplete or
incorrect information).
121. See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. GAO-21-482, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE:
BENEFICIARY DISENROLLMENTS TO FEE-FOR-SERVICE IN LAST YEAR OF LIFE INCREASE
MEDICARE SPENDING (Jun. 28, 2021), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-482 (finding that
beneficiaries in the last year of their life switched from Medicare Advantage plans to traditional
Medicare at more than twice the rate of other Medicare Advantage enrollees, which stakeholders
attributed to potential limitations in accessing specialized care through Medicare Advantage plans).
122. See, e.g., MITRE, supra note 2 (finding that seventy-five percent of insured people have
some level of concern about financial hardship due to medical bills and four-in-ten insured patients
worried about a bill because their insurer did not cover as much as expected, their procedure was
not covered, or their provider was out of network). Claxton et al., supra note 2, at 10 (finding that
rising average deductibles in employer-sponsored health plans have increased the burden of
deductibles by ninety-two percent across all covered workers over the past decade).
123. See, e.g., Rebecca Pifer, San Diego Sues Molina, Kaiser, Centene’s HealthNet over
Alleged ‘Ghost Networks’, HEALTHCARE DIVE (Jun. 28, 2021), https://www.healthcaredive.com
/news/san-diego-sues-molina-kaiser-centenes-healthnet-over-alleged-ghost-netw/602494/
(summarizing a lawsuit filed by the City of San Diego against Kaiser Permanente, Molina, and
HealthNet (a subsidiary of Centene) alleging that the insurers “failed to maintain accurate provider
directories, misleading consumers with the so-called ‘ghost networks’ that are illegal under state
and federal law” with overall error rates of nineteen percent, fifty-eight percent, and eighteen
percent, respectively, in 2019).
124. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE IN
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE ASSOCIATED WITH DUAL ELIGIBILITY OR ELIGIBILITY FOR A LOWINCOME SUBSIDY viii (2021) (noting that low-income beneficiaries and dual eligibles “often
received worse clinical care” through Medicare Advantage plans than other Medicare beneficiaries
in 2018); Laura Dague et al., The Line Between Medicaid and Marketplace: Coverage Effects from
Wisconsin’s Partial Expansion (Nov. 29, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke U.
Press) (concluding that traditional Medicaid expansion would have more effectively increased
coverage in Wisconsin compared to relying on the ACA marketplace to cover certain low-income
populations).
125. See, e.g., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NO. OEI-03-1700474, SOME MEDICARE ADVANTAGE COMPANIES LEVERAGED CHART REVIEWS AND HEALTH
RISK ASSESSMENTS TO DISPROPORTIONATELY DRIVE PAYMENTS (2021) (finding that some
Medicare Advantage companies—twenty of the total 162 Medicare Advantage companies—use
chart reviews and health risk assessments to maximize risk-adjusted payments, resulting in an
additional $9.2 billion in payments, and recommending additional oversight and monitoring of
outlier companies).
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overpricing or inadequate spending, 126 and conflicts of interest. 127 These
behaviors persist at a time of record profits for many health insurers 128 and even
though the government often pays more for private plans than traditional public
coverage. 129 And, despite its popularity—and the $360 billion spent by Medicaid

126. See, e.g., Eastman et al., supra note 101, at 3 (estimating that about fourteen percent of
commercial insurers subject to the ACA’s medical loss ratio requirement engage in strategic
overestimates that result in underpayment of rebates to policyholders); Jeff Lagasse, UnitedHealth,
Anthem Medicare Advantage Plans Penalized for Inadequate Spending, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Sept.
17, 2021), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/unitedhealth-anthem-medicare-advan
tage-plans-penalized-inadequate-spending (describing suspensions of four Medicare Advantage
plans for 2022 because those plans failed to meet minimum medical loss ratios for three consecutive
years).
127. See, e.g., Paige Minemyer, Centene to Pay $27.6M to Settle PBM Investigation in Kansas,
FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Dec. 7, 2021, 2:00 PM), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/centeneto-pay-27-6m-to-settle-pbm-investigation-kansas (describing one of several recent settlements
between Centene and state governments over allegations that the company’s pharmacy benefits
manager subsidiary overcharged the state Medicaid program); David Jackson, Illinois’ $16 Billion
Health Program Riddled with Industry Ties and Potential Conflicts of Interest, MOD. HEALTHCARE
(Nov. 12, 2021, 2:43 PM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/medicaid/illinois-medicaid-pro
gram-riddled-industry-ties-and-conflicts-interest (discussing an investigation by the Better
Government Association on potential conflicts of interest in the management of Illinois’ Medicaid
managed care program).
128. See, e.g., Tara Bannow, Goldman Sachs Projects Positive 2022 for Big Insurers, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/insurance/goldman-sachsprojects-rosy-2022-unitedhealth-group-anthem-cvs (discussing a “rosy outlook” for publicly
traded health insurers and describing “a significant profit opportunity in Medicare Advantage”);
Bob Herman, Health Insurers Still Aren’t That Worried About the Coronavirus, AXIOS (Nov. 5,
2021), https://www.axios.com/health-insurers-still-arent-that-worried-about-the-coronavirus-6926
75c3-ea33-4f28-80b1-2f796a57aaea.html (“Health insurers remain significantly more profitable
today than they were before the pandemic, even after factoring in COVID costs.”); Amanda
Holpuch, Pandemic Profits: Top U.S. Health Insurers Make Billions in Second Quarter,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/aug/06/ushealthcare-insurance-covid-19-coronavirus (summarizing the status of insurer profits in 2021 and
noting a congressional investigation into insurer profits begun in 2020); Reed Abelson, Major U.S.
Health Insurers Report Big Profits, Benefiting from the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05/health/covid-insurance-profits.html (summarizing the status
of insurer profits in 2020 and noting that consumers are entitled to millions of dollars in medical
loss ratio rebates).
129. See, e.g., Jeannie Fuglesten Biniek et al., Higher and Faster Growing Spending Per
Medicare Advantage Enrollee Adds to Medicare’s Solvency and Affordability Challenges, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/higher-and-fastergrowing-spending-per-medicare-advantage-enrollee-adds-to-medicares-solvency-and-affordabili
ty-challenges/ (describing how spending on beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage plans is higher
and growing faster per person for beneficiaries in traditional Medicare and the implications for total
Medicare spending and beneficiary costs); Bob Herman, Medicare Has Become More of a Private
Marketplace—And It’s Costly, AXIOS (Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.axios.com/medicare-advan
tage-enrollment-spending-pandemic-risk-adjustment-d1a608ff-15eb-47bf-8952-0e1c5af097
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on comprehensive managed care in 2020—research suggests that Medicaid
managed care may not result in the lower costs, expanded access, or improved
quality that its advocates often tout. 130
Some might use the data cited above to argue that private insurers can never
achieve the goals of health reform due to their inherent need to maximize profit;
this, in turn, demands an expansion of truly public coverage. But, if we assume
that private insurers will remain a core part of the nation’s health care financing
infrastructure and a key recipient of federal funds, the same data can be
interpreted as a call to action for additional accountability measures and
consumer protections.
Yet Congress has done little to pair recent coverage expansions with new
accountability measures for private insurers. The pandemic relief packages
adopted in 2020 made relatively few changes to coverage and did not include
explicit accountability measures. 131 Neither did the American Rescue Plan Act,
which temporarily expanded marketplace subsidies and fully subsidized private
COBRA continuation coverage for laid-off workers. 132 In the Build Back Better
Act, Congress may further expand private coverage by extending enhanced
ACA subsidies and relying on (private) marketplace plans to fill the Medicaid
coverage gap in the twelve states that have yet to expand this (public) program
to low-income adults. 133 But, as with the pandemic relief packages, there are
few, if any, accountability measures designed to change insurer practice to the
benefit of consumers and taxpayers.

d5.html (“The federal government paid almost $350 billion to MA insurers for this year, a 10%
increase from 2020.”).
130. See, e.g., Has Medicaid Managed Care Delivered on Its Promise?, TRADEOFFS (Nov. 4,
2021), https://tradeoffs.org/2021/11/04/medicaid-managed-care/ (summarizing literature reviews
on the evidence that Medicaid managed care has led to lower costs and improved access and
quality).
131. The legislation bolstered state Medicaid programs, required a wide range of public and
private payers to cover COVID-19 testing and vaccines without cost-sharing, and authorized one
billion dollars for the National Disaster Medical System to pay for COVID-19 testing for the
uninsured. See Katie Keith, Senate Passes COVID-19 Package #3: The Coverage Provisions,
HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200326
.765600/full/.
132. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9501(a)(3), 135 Stat. 4, 129
(2021).
133. Alice Miranda Ollstein, Democrats Pitch Industry-Friendly Medicaid Workaround to Win
Manchin’s Support, POLITICO (Oct. 26, 2021, 2:01PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/10
/26/democrats-pitch-medicaid-workaround-manchin-517213. In a prior iteration of the Build Back
Better Act considered by the U.S. House of Representatives, federal officials would have been
required to contract with private Medicaid managed care companies to deliver benefits in nonexpansion states. Katie Keith, Unpacking the Coverage Provisions in the House’s Build Back Better
Act, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Sept. 12, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210
912.160204/full/.
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One narrow exception is in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021
where Congress required private insurers to establish a new verification process
to assess the accuracy of its provider directories every ninety days and hold
harmless the patients who rely on inaccurate provider network information. 134
The challenges associated with accurate provider network directories are welldocumented. 135 Under this recent law, consumers who rely on inaccurate
provider network information cannot be forced to pay more in cost-sharing than
they would have paid if the provider had actually been in their plan’s network
(as they expected). 136 The same is true if the insurer failed to provide the
information at all. 137 It remains the enrollee’s responsibility to check the network
status of their provider. 138 But the new law assures that patients will not bear the
brunt of negative consequences for relying on their insurer. 139
These types of policies are, however, few and far between. This Part takes a
first pass at identifying a non-exhaustive list of policies that federal and state
officials could consider to better ensure that taxpayer-subsidized private
coverage ensures patient access to care and protects consumers’ financial
security.
A.

A New Baseline: Shifting the Burden of Proof to Private Insurers

Policymakers have long considered and debated the role of insurers in
holding down costs, particularly by limiting access to care. 140 The negative
experiences (or perceptions) associated with limits on provider choice have
continued to inform payer decisions even now, with many employers unwilling
to engage in limited networks even when doing so could reduce premiums and
incentivize value-based care. 141 Instead, employers increasingly shift costs to
134. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 116, 134 Stat. 1182, 2879
(2020).
135. See, e.g., Abigail Burman, Laying Ghost Networks to Rest: Combatting Deceptive Health
Plan Provider Directories, 40 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. 78, 82 (2021); Jaclyn Kleban, Countering
Misinformation in the Health Care System: The Case for Stricter Regulations Within Health
Insurance Provider Directories, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1185, 1189 (2020).
136. § 116, 134 Stat. at 2880.
137. § 116, 134 Stat. at 2881.
138. See Burman, supra note 135, at 80.
139. § 116, 134 Stat. at 2880(1)(A).
140. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, From Hero to Goat: Managed Care in the 1990s, 47 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 217, 217–19 (2003) (offering a history of managed care in the 1990s and citing the
“large literature” on managed care backlash). Prof. Greaney’s essay provided a foreword to an issue
of the Saint Louis University Journal devoted to managed care based on the 2002 symposium,
Looking Beyond A Patient Bill of Rights: The Future of Managed Care. Id. at 217.
141. See, e.g., SABRINA CORLETTE ET AL., ASSESSING RESPONSES TO INCREASED PROVIDER
CONSOLIDATION IN SIX MARKETS: FINAL REPORT 4 (2019); Gary Claxton et al., Employer
Strategies to Reduce Health Costs and Improve Quality Through Network Configuration,
PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker
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employees and their families in the form of higher deductibles and other out-ofpocket costs. 142
To help keep costs down, private insurers turn to other tools that limit or
discourage care. These practices vary by insurer but often take the form of
utilization management policies (such as prior authorization or step therapy) and
restrictive medical necessity criteria (that leads to claims denials). 143 Proponents
argue that these tools can hold down costs and prevent unnecessary care, while
critics argue that these policies limit patient access and drive-up health care costs
through administrative burdens. 144
Utilization management and restrictive medical necessity criteria require
providers and patients to take additional steps to secure prior authorization for
care and to appeal claims denials. 145 In both instances, the patient’s access to
care is limited while paperwork is completed, and a waiting game begins to see
if the insurer will challenge the treating provider’s clinical judgment. Patients
whose care is denied may simply go without care or are forced to pay out-ofpocket for care they expected to be covered. These burdens have been shown to
discourage providers from seeing patients enrolled in certain programs. For
instance, physicians lose seventeen percent of Medicaid revenue to billing

.org/brief/employer-strategies-to-reduce-health-costs-and-improve-quality-through-networkconfiguration/.
142. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 141, at 5 (“[T]he most widespread strategy among
employers to constrain their health plan costs has been to shift them to employees, largely through
higher deductibles.”).
143. AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT FOR MEDICATIONS FOR
ADDICTION TREATMENT TOOLKIT 3–4 (2021), https://pcssnow.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07
/Utilization-Management-Toolkit.pdf; Aaron L. Schwartz et al., Measuring the Scope of Prior
Authorization Policies: Applying Private Insurer Rules to Medicare Part B, JAMA, May 28, 2021,
at 2.
144. See Peter Orszag & Rahul Rekhi, Real-Time Adjudication for Health Insurance Claims,
1% STEPS FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, https://onepercentsteps.com/policy-briefs/real-timeadjudication-for-health-insurance-claims/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2022) (estimating that claims
administration and adjudication accounts for up to six percent of provider and payer revenue, which
represents a significant administrative health care cost); Prior Authorization and Step Therapy, AM.
ACAD. FAM. PHYSICIANS, 1–2 https://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/advocacy/legal/ad
ministrative/BKG-PriorAuthorization.pdf (last updated Oct. 2021) (describing physician and
patient concerns with prior authorization, including high time and cost burdens, delayed care, and
negative outcomes); Jennifer Snow et al., The Impact of Step Therapy Policies on Patients,
XCENDA AMERISOURCEBERGEN 1–2 (2019), https://www.xcenda.com/-/media/assets/xcenda/en
glish/content-assets/white-papers-issue-briefs-studies-pdf/impact-of-step-therapy-on-patients
_final_1019.pdf (summarizing the literature on the impact of step therapy policies on patients).
145. AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., supra note 143, at 8; Frequently Asked Questions: Medical
Management and Prior Authorization, AM. HEALTH INS. PLANS 3, https://www.ahip.org/docu
ments/Prior-Authorization-FAQs.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2022).
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problems, and physicians respond to billing problems by refusing to serve
Medicaid patients in states with more severe billing hurdles. 146
In contrast, traditional public payers typically do not apply the same carelimiting policies. Unlike Medicare Advantage, for instance, fee-for-service
Medicare uses minimal prior authorization. 147 This distinction between the two
types of payers for the same covered care has attracted calls for reform from
federal policymakers. 148
This Section argues that federal and state policymakers should consider a
new framework for the provision of care by shifting the burden of securing care
from patients and providers onto private insurers who would face the burden of
denying care. Care recommended by an enrollee’s in-network provider would
be presumed valid unless the insurer shows that this recommendation is
unreasonable. Put another way, insurers would be required to justify why a claim
is being denied—rather than requiring providers and patients to seek permission
for care, as is the current typical practice.
1. Prior Authorization
Currently, the burden of seeking and obtaining prior authorization—by
showing that care should be covered and provided—rests on patients and
providers. 149 The default is that care is not covered unless allowed by the
insurer. 150 Policymakers could shift this burden to insurers, making them
responsible for showing why care should be denied. This would create a
presumption that a provider’s medical recommendation is valid unless the
insurer could show that the provider’s recommendation is unreasonable.
As one important guardrail, the new default could apply only to care
provided by in-network providers. Why? Because insurers should only be
contracting with providers whose medical judgments they think are generally
reasonable. Such a shift could also give insurers more leverage in negotiating

146. Abe Dunn et al., A Denial A Day Keeps the Doctor Away, National Bureau of Economic
Research 26 (NBER Working Paper No. 29010), https://www.nber.org/papers/w29010.
147. Schwartz et al., supra note 143, at 1–2.
148. Jessie Hellmann & Nona Tepper, Bipartisan Bill Would Revamp Medicare Advantage
Prior Authorization, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 13, 2021, 2:25 PM), https://www.modernhealth
care.com/insurance/bipartisan-bill-would-revamp-medicare-advantage-prior-authorization
(discussing proposed legislation in Congress that would require Medicare Advantage plans to
disclose prior authorization policies in response to concerns from providers that prior authorization
is overused, costly, and inefficient).
149. See AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., supra note 143, at 1; Amanda DeMarzo, What is Prior
Authorization, NAT’L BD. PRIOR AUTHORIZATION SPECIALISTS (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.prior
authtraining.org/prior-authorization/.
150. How U.S. Health Insurance Works, STAN. UNIV. VADEN HEALTH SERVS., https://vaden
.stanford.edu/insurance/health-insurance-overview/how-us-health-insurance-works (last visited
Mar. 2, 2022).
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network status with providers, many of whom could view relief from this
administrative burden as an added benefit for being an in-network provider.
At least two states have already considered such a shift. Under proposed
legislation in Connecticut, an insurer’s clinical review team would be forced to
show a lack of medical necessity before denying a claim. 151 In testimony in
support of this part of the legislation, the Connecticut Office of the Healthcare
Advocate stated that “[t]he default judgment should belong to the in-network
treating physician or other provider who has examined the patient, not to the
insurance company doctor or other reviewer in another state who has never
examined or talked to the patient.” 152 A similar bill was introduced in New
Jersey and would have created a dedicated “carrier appeals program” for insurers
to dispute a claim when care is not medically necessary or appropriate. 153
2. Criteria for Medical Necessity Determinations
Similar burden shifts could be adopted for the criteria that private insurers
use to determine whether a service is “medically necessary” or not. Medical
necessity criteria are based on generally accepted standards of medical
practice. 154 But critics note that “health plans are increasingly adopting
formulaic rules that restrict when generally covered treatments will be paid
for.” 155 This “rulification” of medical necessity—through detailed clinical
criteria—transforms plan determinations into “rules-based exercise[s]” that
leave little room for medical judgment and undermine a patient’s ability to
successfully appeal a claims denial based on these “rulified” criteria. 156
To address these challenges, policymakers could require all private insurers
to use standard clinical criteria when assessing medical necessity. This would
again shift the burden—in this case, of understanding and applying variable
insurer policies—from providers and patients back onto insurers, who would be
required to show why a given patient’s care is inconsistent with generally
accepted standards of medicine.

151. An Act Concerning Step Therapy, Adverse Determination and Utilization Reviews, and
Health Insurance Coverage for Children, Stepchildren and Other Dependent Children, S.B. 1045,
2021 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2021) The legislation was passed by the Connecticut senate,
but not the house.
152. Testimony Before the Insurance and Real Estate Committee Re: S.B. 1045, Conn. Off. of
the Healthcare Advoc., 2021 Gen. Assemb. (2021) (statement of Ted Doolittle, Healthcare
Advocate, of Connecticut).
153. S.B. 558, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2022).
154. How U.S. Health Insurance Works, supra note 150.
155. Daniel Schwarcz & Amy B. Monahan, Preserving Meaningful External Review Despite
Insurers’ Rulification of Medical Necessity, HARV. L. BILL HEALTH (May 7, 2021),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/07/medical-necessity-rules-external-review/.
156. Id.
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Generally accepted standards of medical practice are, by definition,
universal. 157 As such, consumers should not have to worry if the same care will
be considered differently under different plans from different insurers. Short of
requiring standardization, insurer medical necessity rules should be set aside by
external reviewers, even when those rules are contained in insurance policies or
formal health plan documents, under certain circumstances. 158
3. Increased Standardization of Benefits, Cost-Sharing, and Exclusions
In addition to standardizing clinical criteria, policymakers could embrace
standardization of other elements of plan design—especially consumer-facing
elements such as covered benefits, cost-sharing, and exclusions. Doing so would
build upon the ACA’s reforms that required insurers in the individual and small
group markets to cover the essential health benefits package. This led to more
standardization among plans—which must now cover a minimum set of ten
categories of essential health benefits and meet minimum actuarial value tiers
for cost-sharing. 159 But there is still significant variation among plans in the
benefits covered, cost-sharing for covered benefits, and plan exclusions. 160
Much has been written about the benefits of plan standardization and
improved plan choice architecture, especially given low levels of health
insurance literacy and the complexity of health insurance. 161 In light of these
benefits, several states have already embraced standardized plans. 162 At the
federal level, the Obama administration adopted optional standardized plans for

157. Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Rules of Medical Necessity, 107 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3777505.
158. Id. (manuscript at 59–60); Schwarcz & Monahan, supra note 155 (“[F]ederal regulations
should make clear that the ACA requires external reviewers to apply traditional, standard-based,
definitions of medical necessity when reviewing denials of coverage that are premised on medical
judgments.”).
159. See, e.g., Petra W. Rasmussen & Erin A. Taylor, What Can the Federal Government Learn
from States About Health Insurance Plan Standardization?, JAMA HEALTH F., Nov. 12, 2021, at
1; Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Information on Essential Health Benefits (EHB)
Benchmark Plans, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Re
sources/Data-Resources/ehb (last visited Mar. 2, 2022).
160. Rasmussen & Taylor, supra note 159.
161. See, e.g., id.; Douglas Jacobs, CMS’ Standardized Plan Option Could Reduce
Discrimination, HEALTH AFFS. (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog201
60106.052546/full/; see also Austin Frakt, Why Consumers Often Err in Choosing Health Plans,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/upshot/why-consumers-oftenerr-in-choosing-health-plans.html.
162. Justin Giovannelli et al., State Efforts to Standardize Marketplace Health Plans Show How
the Biden Administration Could Improve Value and Reduce Disparities, COMMONWEALTH FUND
(Jul. 28, 2021), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2021/state-efforts-standardize-market
place-health-plans.
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the federal marketplace; 163 the Biden administration went further, requiring
insurers to offer standardized plans, beginning with the 2023 plan year. 164
Standardization of benefits, cost-sharing, and exclusions would shift some
of the burden of pre-enrollment plan analysis from consumers to insurers.
Consumers would still have some responsibility: many would need to check
provider network directories and prescription drug formularies to see if their
providers and drugs are in-network and covered. But additional standardization
would reduce the guesswork for consumers by simplifying coverage
comparisons and ensuring that patient care is covered by any subsidized private
plan a consumer might select.
As just one example, Out2Enroll—a national initiative that connects
LGBTQ people with coverage options under the ACA—publishes an annual
analysis of the degree to which federal marketplace plans include transgenderspecific health insurance exclusions. 165 This analysis (of hundreds and
sometimes thousands of plans) takes a team of researchers several weeks to
identify plans, locate underlying documents, and then assess the coverage
language for each plan. 166 This data is then converted into state-specific
enrollment guides for transgender consumers who use this information to
understand their coverage options during annual and special enrollment
periods. 167 This analysis is limited to only exclusions and does not assess costsharing, provider networks, or other important design elements that are equally
important to transgender consumers. 168
Additional standardization of plan exclusions across insurers would
eliminate the need for this type of analysis, limit discriminatory benefit design,
and help better ensure that transgender consumers have access to the care that
they need. Instead of a multi-week analysis to uncover this information,
transgender consumers could expect that medically necessary care would be
covered. Recognizing the need for standardization and equal access, Colorado
updated its essential health benefits benchmark to affirm and clarify insurer

163. Timothy Jost, CMS Finalizes New Marketplace Payment Rule, Effective January 17, 2017,
HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.201612
18.058014/full/; see also Timothy Jost, The Final 2018 Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters
(Part 2), HEALTH AFFS. (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog201612
18.058022/full/.
164. 87 Fed. Reg. 27,310–22 (May 6, 2016).
165. About Us, OUT2ENROLL, https://out2enroll.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2022); see
also Summary of Findings: 2022 Marketplace Plan Compliance with Section 1557, OUT2ENROLL
1 (2022), https://out2enroll.org/out2enroll/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Report-on-Trans-Exclu
sions-in-2022-Marketplace-Plans.pdf [hereinafter Out2Enroll, Summary of Findings].
166. See Out2Enroll, Summary of Findings, supra note 165, at 1, 3.
167. Plan Information for 2022, OUT2ENROLL, https://out2enroll.org/2022-cocs/ (last visited
Mar. 2, 2022).
168. Id.
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coverage of gender-affirming care. 169 This is just one example of how
standardization could better protect consumers. 170
Standardization could also reduce reliance on intermediaries—such as
agents, brokers, or navigators—who advise applicants on the various design
features of each plan and some of whom have a financial interest in the plans in
which enrollees select. In the absence of this type of assistance or unbiased thirdparty analysis, consumers face the daunting task of identifying, assessing, and
selecting an insurance plan that will meet their needs. The complexity of this
process, especially combined with the application process itself, can serve as a
barrier to enrollment, contributing to higher uninsured rates. 171
B.

Improving Monitoring, Oversight, and Enforcement

Even if federal and state policymakers were to adopt the policies and reforms
noted above, enforcement and oversight would likely remain a challenge. Why?
Because current enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to provide complete
protection for consumers. 172
In the fully insured commercial market, federal and state oversight relies
primarily on pre-market review (such as the review and approval of policy forms
and rates) by state insurance departments or the federal Center for Consumer
Information and Insurance Oversight followed by post-market complaints
monitoring and market conduct exams. 173 There is even less oversight of group
health plans, which are regulated almost entirely by the federal Department of
Labor. 174 Federal officials at the federal Department of Health and Human
169. Katie Keith, Unpacking Colorado’s New Guidance on Transgender Health,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2021/unpack
ing-colorados-new-guidance-transgender-health.
170. Similar challenges have been observed in access to information about prescription drugs.
See Ed Silverman, Just How Many Barriers Do Health Insurers Create to Fair Access to
Medicines?, STAT NEWS (Dec. 1, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2021/12/01/healthinsurance-prescription-drugs-access-icer/.
171. See ALLISON PERCY & KAREN STOCKLEY, CONG. BUDGET OFF., 56504, WHO WENT
WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE IN 2019, AND WHY? 2, 18 (2020), https://www.cbo.gov/system
/files/2020-09/56504-Health-Insurance.pdf (“[L]ack of information, confusion, and the complexity
of applying for coverage are common barriers to enrollment.”).
172. See Christine H. Monahan, Private Enforcement of the Affordable Care Act: Towards An
“Implied Warranty of Legality” in Health Insurance, 126 YALE L.J. 1118, 1122–23, 1130 (2017)
(explaining why “state public enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to provide consumers
complete protection from violations” of the ACA).
173. Id. at 1129 n.49, 1130–32.
174. See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. GAO-21-376, ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO
PROTECT PARTICIPANTS’ RIGHTS IN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED RETIREMENT AND HEALTH BENEFIT
PLANS (2021) (describing the Department’s enforcement tools, documenting declines in
investigations over time, and noting that “fewer than 10 percent of investigations were referred for
civil litigation” since fiscal year 2010); Health Plans and Benefits, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans (last visited Feb. 11, 2022).
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Services are responsible for overseeing Medicare Advantage plans and Medicare
Part D prescription drug plans while state officials manage contracts with
Medicaid managed care companies. 175
In general, regulators can investigate misconduct, ask for voluntary
compliance, impose corrective action plans, and fine insurers. 176 Regulators can
also terminate contracts or otherwise bar insurers from participating in the public
program at issue (whether Medicaid, Medicare, or the marketplace). 177 While
these can be effective tools, enforcement action is rarely invoked and often
occurs after consumers have already been harmed. 178
To the extent that federal officials continue to rely on administrative
remedies, there is a significant need for ongoing monitoring and targeted
enforcement of private insurer compliance with federal law. 179 Oversight and
monitoring could be resource-intensive and would require a greater investment
of federal dollars—or at least a prioritization of these efforts for current
funding. 180 But such an investment is critical. It is past time to build the expertise
175. KAISER FAM. FOUND., COMPARISON OF CONSUMER PROTECTIONS IN THREE HEALTH
INSURANCE MARKETS: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE, QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS AND MEDICAID
MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 23, 32 (2015), https://files.kff.org/attachment/report-compari
son-of-consumer-protections-in-three-health-insurance-markets.
176. Monahan, supra note 172, at 1130.
177. Id.
178. Part C and Part D Enforcement Actions, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Compliance-and-Audits/Part-C-and-Part-D-Compliance-andAudits/PartCandPartDEnforcementActions- (last visited Dec. 19, 2021). Comprehensive data on
enforcement actions do not appear to be available for all programs, but the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services publishes program audits and audit results, as well as a list of civil monetary
penalties, intermediate sanctions, and termination notices for its oversight of insurers participating
in Medicare Part C and Part D. Id. As of December 19, 2021, federal officials identified seventyeight enforcement actions since 2017. Id. (showing a complete list of audits published since 2017).
The Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight has a website dedicated to federal
enforcement for marketplace plans but has posted only two federal market conduct examination
final reports. Compliance and Enforcement, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms
/compliance (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
179. John V. Jacobi et al., Health Insurer Market Behavior After the Affordable Care Act:
Assessing the Need for Monitoring, Targeted Enforcement, and Regulatory Reform, 120 PENN ST.
L. REV. 109, 113 (2015); Katie Keith et al., Nondiscrimination Under the Affordable Care Act,
GEO. UNIV. HEALTH POL’Y INST., 16 (2013), https://chir.georgetown.edu/publications/#c
_ea8c8c5836e4.
180. See ALLAN BAUMGARTEN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FED’N., ANALYZING MEDICAID
MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS: STATE PRACTICES FOR CONTRACTING WITH MANAGED CARE
ORGANIZATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS 2, 15 (2020), https://www.rwjf.org/en
/library/research/2020/08/analyzing-medicaid-managed-care-organizations—state-practices-forcontracting-with-managed-care-organizations-and-oversight-of-contractors.html
(“Successful
Medicaid managed care programs devote resources to ongoing oversight, auditing and evaluation
of MCO performance.”); see also Has Medicaid Managed Care Delivered on Its Promise?, supra
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of federal officials to ensure that taxpayer-subsidized products work in a way
that Congress intended and actually deliver health care to enrollees.
Taking ACA-regulated qualified health plans as an example, federal
officials could begin by collecting, auditing, and using more federally mandated
transparency data to better assess and publicize health plan performance and
approve plans for sale through the marketplace. 181 As suggested above, there is
a need for additional oversight on insurer MLR filings and improvements for
rate review standards. Similar attention appears needed in other programs as
well, with concerns raised about the gaming of Medicare Advantage star ratings
and the risk adjustment program. 182
Some have argued that administrative enforcement is, on its own,
insufficient and that private enforcement is needed to protect consumers. 183
Indeed, private enforcement of the Medicaid Act by beneficiaries and providers
has helped shape the Medicaid program and complemented federal oversight. 184
But similar causes of action may be of limited availability for other types of
private insurance products, such as marketplace plans. 185

note 130. For instance, several states are reorienting their contractual arrangements with Medicaid
managed care organizations toward patient access and outcomes while also doing more to monitor
performance and increase oversight over these private insurers.
181. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, Title X, § 2715A,
124 Stat. 884 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15a) (“A group health plan and a health
insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall comply with the
provisions of section 1311(e)(3) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, except that a
plan or coverage that is not offered through an Exchange shall only be required to submit the
information required to the Secretary and the State insurance commissioner, and make such
information available to the public.”).
182. See, e.g., Lauren Flynn Kelly, Recent MA Coding Complaints Signal DOJ’s ‘Evolving
Expectations’, MMIT: AIS HEALTH (Dec. 2, 2021), https://aishealth.mmitnetwork.com/blogs
/radar-on-medicare-advantage/recent-ma-coding-complaints-signal-doj-s-evolving-expectations;
Bob Herman, The Lake Wobegon Effect in Medicare Advantage, AXIOS: HEALTH (Oct. 11, 2021),
https://www.axios.com/medicare-advantage-star-ratings-2022-c68929e2-82c7-4d8c-aea0-2df303
61able.html; Allison K. Hoffman, Federal Court Upholds Changes to Medicare Advantage Star
Ratings During the COVID-19 Pandemic, COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE POINT (Sept. 2, 2021),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2021/federal-court-upholds-changes-medicare-advan
tage-star-ratings-during-covid-19-pandemic.
183. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Implementing Health Reform in an Era of Semi-Cooperative
Federalism: Lessons from the Age 26 Expansion, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 327, 359 (2015);
Sarah L. Grusin, Holding Health Insurance Marketplaces Accountable: The Unheralded Rise and
Imminent Demise of Structural Reform Litigation in Health Care, 24 ANNALS HEALTH L. 337, 338
(2015).
184. See Grusin, supra note 183, at 350–51. There is no express or implied cause of action for
private enforcement of the Medicaid Act, but plaintiffs have been able to sue because of the state’s
involvement in administering the Medicaid program. Id. at 350 (“[P]rivate enforcement is still
viable in the Medicaid context despite the increased delegation of authority to private entities.”).
185. See id. at 368.
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To address this, some experts have called for an “implied warranty of
legality” for ACA-regulated insurance products. 186 This would allow consumers
to challenge insurer practice in state court by showing that their plan was subject
to the ACA, that they assumed it complied with the law, that the insurer violated
part of the ACA, and that the violation injured them. Allowing consumers to sue
over health plan violations in this way would help “correct the power imbalance
between consumers and insurers” and better incentivize compliance with legal
requirements. 187
V. CONCLUSION
Assuming future coverage expansions will rely on private insurers,
policymakers must begin to pay more attention to holding these entities
accountable for the government-subsidized benefits they offer. Doing so is vital
to protecting enrollees and taxpayers who should receive the benefit of the
government’s bargain with private health insurers. Policymakers have several
options available to them to ensure that taxpayer-subsidized private coverage
accomplishes the goals of health reform—from building on the ACA’s reforms,
to shifting burdens from providers and patients, to improving monitoring,
oversight, and enforcement. Regardless of the policies that federal and state
leaders adopt, it will remain crucial to pair coverage expansions with
accountability mechanisms to maximize taxpayer value in subsidizing private
coverage across a range of public programs.

186. Monahan, supra note 172, at 1124.
187. Id. at 1179.

